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Introduction
With the expected introduction of robots into our daily lives, providing mechanisms to avoid unde-
sired attacks and exploits in robot communication software is becoming increasingly required. Just
as during the beginnings of the computer age (Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2002), robotics is established
in a “happy naivety,” where security rules against external attacks are not adopted, assuming that
robotics knowledgeable people are well intended. While this may have been true in the past, the
mass adoption of robots will increase the possibilities of attacks. This fact is especially relevant in
defense, medical and other critical fields involving humans, where tampering can result in serious
bodily harm and/or privacy invasions. For these reasons, we consider that researchers and industry
should deploy efforts in cyber safety and acquire good practices when developing and distributing
robot software. We propose the term Cryptobotics as a unifying term for research and applications
of computer and microcontrollers’ security measures in robotics.
Stating the Problem
The problems that the field of robotics will face are similar to those the computer revolution faced
with the widespread of the Internet 30 years ago. Among the common attacks computers may suffer,
there are: denial-of-service, eavesdropping, spoofing, tampering, privilege escalation, or information
disclosure for instance. To these problems, robots add the additional factor of physical interaction.
While taking the control of a desktop computer or a server may result in loss of information (with
its associated costs), taking the control of a robot may endanger whatever or whoever is near.
As robots become more integrated on the communications networks, it seems appropriate to
reuse the tools designed for web applications in order to controls the robots. However, the authors
consider there are differences between regular computers communicating through the network, and
robots performing the same actions. Mohanarajah et al. (2015) states differences between web and
robotic applications: “Web applications are typically stateless, single processes that use a request-
response model to talk to the client. Meanwhile, robotic applications are stateful, multiprocessed,
and require a bidirectional communication with the client. These fundamental differences may
lead to different tradeoffs and design choices and may ultimately result in different software
solutions for web and robotics applications.” To these differences, we could also add the real-time
constraints that characterize robotics applications. Despite other sources of issues, like software
bugs or vulnerabilities [buffer overflow, command injection, etc. (Tanenbaum and Bos, 2014)], we
consider that communications currently are one of the main vulnerabilities in robotics.
A number of fields in robotics where security and privacy are particularly relevant can be
addressed.
 Defense and Space: The military field should be very aware of the best practices in cyber security
to be followed regarding its robots. Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly called “drones,” are
being destined to surveillance and also to combat missions. Common sense dictates that any
communications with these vehicles should be encrypted (Javaid et al., 2012), but reality shows us
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differently. For example, in the year 2012 it was reported that
only between 30 and 50 percent of America’s Predators and
Reapers (two of the most used drones in US) were using fully
encrypted transmissions.1
Situation: a non-authorized entity eavesdrops
surveillance images of drones, takes its control,
exploiting a non-encrypted connection, and crashes
it into a populated area.
Situation: a non-authorized entity takes control of a
robot inside International Space Station and sabo-
tages an ongoing experiment.
 Telemedicine and Remote surgery: This exciting field canmake
remote surgery become an everyday reality, where experts can
operate patients from the other side of the world. While this is
beneficial to society, we must consider the potential dangers. In
2009, the Interoperable Telesurgery Protocol (ITP) (King et al.,
2009) was proposed as a preliminary specification for interop-
erability among robotic telesurgery systems. Recently, the fact
that ITP does not use any form of encryption or authentication
was discovered.2 This is an obvious system exposure to exploits
using aman-in-the-middle attack for taking control of the robot
(Bonaci et al., 2015).
Situation: a non-authorized entity takes control of a
surgery robot during an operation, endangering the
life of the patient.
 Household robots: This market is growing both in research and
commercially available robots. Robots will be used as assistants
at home. For instance, one of these projects is Care-O-bot (Hans
et al., 2002), a robotic assistant in homes. In one of the available
versions, this robot is equippedwithmicrophones, cameras and
3D sensors. This set of sensors can collect a huge amount of
information, which must be protected (Denning et al., 2009).
Service robots may one day also collect data about the health
status of a person; law regulations require that this data is
handled with extra care.
Situation: a non-authorized entity takes control of a
household robot and obtains streams of images with
private data.
 Disaster robots: Since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster
in 2011, the robotics community has increased its efforts to
build and deploy robots for disaster scenarios. One of the
expected tasks these robots will have to face in a disaster
scenario is related to accessing and repairing/disconnecting
dangerous systems. Due to the potential danger that
may arise in these situations (Vuong et al., 2014), robots
should not be able to be externally modified by an external
attack.
Situation: a non-authorized entity takes control of a
robot deployed to disconnect a nuclear platform that
1Most U.S. Drones Openly Broadcast Secret Video Feeds: http://www.wired.com/
2012/10/hack-proof-drone/
2Interoperable Telesurgery Protocol (ITP) Plaintext UnauthenticatedMitMHijack-
ing: http://osvdb.org/121842
may suffer a partial meltdown, and can thwart the
disconnection operation.
Current State of Security in Mainstream
Robotic Software
Robots are a combination of mechanical structures, sensors, actu-
ators, and computer software that manages and controls these
devices. Mainstream practices in robotics involve component-
based software engineering. Each component is designed as an
individual computer program (e.g., a motor moving program)
which communicates with other components using predefined
protocols. While a large quantity of software libraries for com-
munication already exist, the robotics community has devel-
oped a number of “software architectures.” Currently, one of
the most popular robotics-oriented architecture is ROS (Robot
Operating System) (Quigley et al., 2009). Another co-existing
architecture is YARP (Yet Another Robot Platform) (Metta et al.,
2006). Both systems work similarly: a system built using ROS
or YARP consists of a number of programs (nodes or modules),
potentially on several different hosts, connected in a peer-to-peer
topology.
According to ROS documentation3: “Topics are named buses
over which nodes exchange messages. Topics have anonymous
publish/subscribe semantics (.) In general, nodes are not aware
of who they are communicating with.” From the point of
view of security, this anonymous communication scheme is
a welcome sign toward exploits (McClean et al., 2013). Mes-
sages are sent unencrypted through TCP/IP or UDP/IP. The
default check performed is an initial MD5 sum of the mes-
sage structure, a mechanism used to assure the parties agree
on the layout of the message. Some researchers have developed
an authentication mechanism for achieving secure authentica-
tion for remote, non-native clients in ROS (Toris et al., 2014).
While it can increase the security of the overall system, without
data encryption, an eavesdropper could acquire non-encrypted
information.
Part of the ROS community is dedicating efforts to integrating
OMG’s DDS (Data Distribution Service) as a transport layer for
ROS 2.0.4 A preliminary alpha version has just been released.
DDS is a standard specification followed by several vendors for
a middleware providing publish-subscribed communications for
real-time and embedded systems. RTI provides plugins which
comply with the DDS Security specification including authenti-
cation, access control and cryptography. It would be a big step
forward for securing our robots if ROS 2.0 aimed to comply with
the DDS Security specification as well.
YARP states among its documentation5: “A [default] new con-
nection to a YARP port is established via handshaking on a TCP
port. So everyone who can access this TCP port can connect
to your YARP port. So if you are not behind a firewall, you
are exposing your YARP infrastructure to the world (.) And if
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leak.” Other YARP documentation reads clearly6: “If you expose
machines running YARP to the Internet, expect your robot to
1 day be commanded to make a crude gesture at your funders
by a script kiddie in New Zealand.” However, an authentication
mechanism can be activated in YARP, which adds a key exchange
to the initial handshaking in order to authenticate any connec-
tion request. It has been enabled by default so it is always com-
piled. However, to preserve backward compatibility, the feature is
skipped at runtime if the user does not configure it by providing a
file that contains the authentication key.
Additionally, a new port monitoring and arbitration (Paikan
et al., 2014) functionality inside YARPhas been used to implement
a LUAencoder/decoder of data.7Data are passed through aBase64
encoder before being sent, and decoded upon reception at the
target port. A similar mechanism could potentially be used to
encrypt and decrypt the data.
A limited amount of other works has also focused on secur-
ing robot communications. In Groza and Dragomir (2008), they
implement an authentication protocol to assure the authenticity of
the information when controlling a robot via TCP/IP. However,
they do not implement encrypted communications. In Coble
et al. (2010), they implemented a hardware system that verifies
integrity and health of the system software (to avoid tampering) in
telesurgical robots. Regarding the previously mention ITP proto-
col, some researchers are working on security enhancements (Lee
and Thuraisingham, 2012). One commercially available robot
that does take cyber security into account is BeamPro, a telep-
resence robot8 where secure protocols, symmetric encryption,
and data authentication are used, thus providing security and
privacy.
Secure communications are evenmore important in new trends
in robotics which aim at outsourcing computation, namely Cloud
Robotics. In this paradigm, robots use their sensors to collect data,
and then upload the information to a remote computation center,
where the information is processed, andmay be shared with other
robots. Rapyuta (Mohanarajah et al., 2015) is an example of this
paradigmwhere the technologies used (e.g., WebSockets) allow to
secure the information.
Another usual way of communications between robot’s devices
is through communication buses (CAN, EtherCAT, etc.). Cur-
rently, none of the traditional field buses offers security fea-
tures against intentional attacks (Dzung et al., 2005). However,
those based on ethernet could potentially make use of the secu-
rity measures included in TCP/UDP/IP. For instance, secure
routers (e.g., EDR-G903), include firewalls andVPNs, and support
EtherCAT.
Discussion
A big market of opportunities for research regarding cyber safety
in robotics exists.Most robots are not yet prepared, from a security
point of view, to be deployed in daily life. The software is not
prepared to protect against attacks, because communications are
usually unencrypted.
Regarding the dates of the exploits presented, and the current
hype in deployment of daily robotics (vacuum cleaners, amateur
drones, etc.), Cryptobotics, understood as a mix of cyber security
and robotics, comes just in time to prepare these systems to be
safely used.
An important issue to be discussed is whether the implemen-
tation of encrypted communications may affect the performance,
especially in real-time systems. The question about performance is
highly dependant on the hardware, the software and the network
used. Encrypted communications on the Internet (https, ssh)
show us that it is possible to perform secure communications
and offer remote services. For instance, Adam Langley (Google
Senior Staff Software Engineer) has stated: “whenGoogle changed
Gmail from http to https (.) we had to deploy no additional
machines and no special hardware. On our production front-end
machines, SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1 of the CPU load.9”
From our experience in humanoid robotics, a 1% overhead (while
respecting determinism in time) can be acceptable if it means our
devices can be less vulnerable to cyber attacks. Could an 8MHz
microcontroller perform real-time encryption? Is it reasonable to
implement authentication mechanisms along field buses in time-
constrained scenarios? This article intends to raise awareness for
developers to determine whether it is viable to integrate these
mechanisms depending on each specific use case.
Some may ask why these problems have not been addressed
previously. In recent years, intrinsically safe industrial robots, the
rise of domestic robots, and the use of mobile robots in public
spaces, have arisen issues that the robotics community did not
have to face in its previous 60 years of existence. Researchers are
now focused on developing applications to make robots useful,
which may have made cyber safety a low priority.
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